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Strategic Competition over School Inputs and Outputs 
Gary Richard Cohen* 
Abstract 
Although public schools are not generally subject to direct competition for students, it is commonly thought that 
they nonetheless .face competition through parents' residential choice. Such competitive effects are likely to depend 
on the relative proximity of school districts if it is less costly to move short distances than long, or if parents are 
able t.o more easily send their children to nearby districts through open enrollment policies. Using panel data for 
607 Ohio school districts from 1998 to 2007, I test for strategic interaction over teacher salaries and standardized 
test scores. I present evidence that Ohio public school districts act to 'follow their neighbors; - that is, that they 
attempt to exactly mirror changes in the inputs and outputs of nearby school districts ~and I show that this result 
is robust to different definitions of 'neighbor.' Ifurther show that conventional estimation of spatial autoregressive 
models via Maximum Likelihood or via poorly-instrumented General Method of Moments may create large biase~ in 
the estimated spatial autocorrelation coefficient. I suggest that this statistical phenomenon may explain some of the 
differences in ' estimated magnitudes of school competition across the spatial literature. 
1 Introduction 
F'tiblic education in the United States is highly decentralized compared to other. developed coUntries, both 
in finance and in instruction methods. This creates great heteroge~eityamong school districts, so that even 
distriCts which are geographically near to one another may vary significantly in goals and performance. In 
Northeast Ohio, the districts of Richmond Heights and South Euclid-Lyndhurst sit less than three miles apart 
and have similar demographic characteristics. However, South Euclid-Lyndhurst schools are rated 'effective' 
by the Ohio Department 'of Education, meeting 15 of 26 state indicators (such as adequate performance on 
proficiency tests) and boasting a 96% on-time graduation nitej by contrast, Richmond Heights is rated a 
'continuous improvement' district - meeting only 8 state indicators and graduating only 88% of their students 
on time. 
In the past decade, addressing such inequalities became regarded as the purview of federal policymakers. 
However, federal reforms attempting to impose uniform standards on public schools - most infamously the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 - have seen little success and large controversy. As those who craft education 
policy have increasingly begun to advocate 'school choice' programs as a means to introduce competitive 
discipline into the public school system, economists have increasingly turned their attention to understanding 
the mechanisms by which that competition occurs. 
While nearby school districts do have the potential to vary widely in many respects, there is reason to 
believe that they exert important influences on one another. Although public schools do not needto compete 
*1 am indebted to Professor Hirschel Kasper for his guidance on both the structure and content of this work. 1 also owe 
special thanks to Professor Ron Cheung for his assistance with the spatial econometrics. Lastly, I would like to thank the rest 
of the Oberlin College Economics faculty and my two student discussants, Eric Hardy and Ian Walker, for their comments on 
the first draft of this paper. 
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2 1. Introduction 
directly for students in the way that private schools do, they are nonetheless accountable to parents to the 
extent that parents vote on school finances and are able to move between districts in order to send their 
children elsewhere. 
These effects are further magnified in Ohio, where the 'property tax reduction factor' and the large 
proportion of schools that admit students under open enrollment give parents greater powers of voice and 
exit. When a:n Ohio school district passes a levy, its revenue is fixed until it can renew the levy or pass 
another; if property values rise, the tax rate automatically falls to compensate. This makes school districts 
more accountable to parents' wishes, as the only way out of a binding nominal revenue constraint is by 
popular vote. In addition, most districts allow students to apply to enroll in other schools or other districts 
without moving residency - neighboring districts in some cases, and any Ohio district in others. This 
drastically lowers the cost of exiting a poorly-performing district. Because parents are able to observe the 
actions and the particular advantages of other school districts - particularly those that are geographically 
close - they are likely to take these observations into account when voting or making attendance decisions 
about their local schools. 1 
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that these interactive effects between school districts are spatially 
dependent. It is reasonable to assume that parents takirig advantage of open enrollment policies will be more 
likely to send their children to nearby schools, whether they are explicitly restricted to neighboring districts 
or whether they simply wish to avoid unreasonably long commutes for their children. It is also reasonable 
to assume that it is less costly for parents to move residence between nearby districts than between those 
that are far apart. 
Because of this, spatial econometric methods may provide useful insight into the nature and degree of such 
interactions. By allowing for the identification of a causal 'spillover' effect between nearby school districts, 
a spatial econometric analysis is able to identify the ways in which school districts respond to the decisions 
of their neighbors. 
Empirical work on strategic competition among schools is importan( because. the predictions of theory 
are ambiguous. An increase in the observed quality of ~ne school district may encourage nearby districts to 
respond strategically, making similar improvements in order to retain students and thus funding. 2 Absent 
strategic behavior, an increase in the quality of one school district will raise property values and thus the 
expected value of future taxes. It then may push those who place little value on public education to move to 
other districts with lower expected tax burdens, while attracting those who highly value public education. 
This:would lead to some districts 'specializing' in having good schools, while others 'speCialize' in having low 
tax costs. 3 
On the other hand, the spatial effects of school competition on teacher salaries are neither theoretically 
ambiguous nor untreated by quantitative research. Teachers compete in regional labor markets; an increase 
in salaries in one district creates pressure on nearby others to increase their own salaries in order to attract 
and retain teachers. Although tenure is far more important in the market for public school teachers than in 
other.s, previous empirical research has found large and significant (on the order of 64% to 100%) 4 spillover 
1 The average student mobility over the sample - defined as the number of students enrolled in a district for less than one 
year ~ is 8%, with a standard deviation of 5%. This translates to 1 in 12.5 with some variation, meaning that most parents 
probably choose districts before students start school but that there is some movement. 
2 See section 2 of Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007) 
3 See Nechyba (2003) for a formal model. 
4 Winters (2010) defines 'neighbor' as school districts within fifty miles and weights nearby districts more greatly than distant 
ones. He finds teacher salaries in a district increase about sixty-four cents for every dollar increase in a district's neighbors. 
MiIlirrtet and Rangapras<;Ld (2007) consider districts neighbors if they are in the same county and find salary increases that 
match neighbors up to dollar-far-dollar parity. 
c 
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effects from the spatially-weighted averages of neighboring districts. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the most relevant literature on public schools. 
Section 3 discusses the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence drawn 
from spatial econometric analysis. Section 5 provides sensitivity analysis for the empirical results. The last 
section concludes and discusses possibilities for further study. 
2 Review of the Literature 
The assertion that schools compete is hardly new.5 Though research into the economics of education 
has long considered competition between public schools through households' decisions to locate based on 
the costs and benefits of local public services,6 only recently have expliCit spatial econometric models been 
applied to competition between schools .. Spatial econometric methods show much promise for the analy-
sis of interactions between neighboring schools, allowing researchers to look beyond the overall effects of 
competition in educational markets and investigate the strength of competition between schools within a 
particular market. This may yield important insight into what factors make a strong environment for ~chool 
competition. 7 
More technically, the presence of a spatial relationship among dependent variables can cause nonspatial 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent. 8 Thus, the discovery of such a relationship casts doubt on the other 
estimators and in particular may result in finding artificially significant effects fornonspatial estimators. 
The presence of spatial correl1l,tion between theetror terms may also be a concern; if shocks froin one unit 
of observation spill over to others, or if unobservable characteristics are correlated across spatial units . larger 
than the unitof observation, failing to account for these correlations may result in inconsistently-estimated 
standard errors. 9 
The literature exa.n:llning strategic competition through spatial econometric methods is young but riowing 
quickly. Blair and Staley (1995) examine a subset of Ohio school districts and find that a school incre~es its 
test scores by half a point for each one point increase in the test scores of neighboring districts, hypothesizing 
that schools compete on quality. Wagner and Porter (2000) and Greenbaum (2002) examine Ohio and 
Pennsylvania resp.ective1y and find that teacher salaries in a district are positively influenced by .t~acher 
salaries in nearby districts, so that an increase of one dollar in neighboring district teacher salaries increases 
one's own teacher salaries by fifty six to ninety six cents. Ghosh (2010) studies Massachusetts public schools 
under open enrollment and finds evidence of spiliovers in per student expenditures, although his point 
estimates are significantly less than one. 
A few recent studies take more care to establish causality through instrumented General Method. of 
Moments (GMM) estimation and find larger spillovers seemingly indicative of stronger competition. I will 
show in Section 5 that this may be thanks to their use of exogenous instruments for competition versus naIve 
Maximum Likelihood estimates. Babcock, Engberg and Greenbaum (2005) and Millimet and Rangaprasad 
(2007) find evidence of teacher salary spillovers in Pennsylvania and spillovers in multiple school inputs 10 in 
illinois; Babcock, Engberg and Greenbaum find that a one dollar increase in teach~r salaries in districts on 
5 See, e.g. Zan~ig (1997) and Hoxby (2000) 
6 Tiebout (1956) 
7 For example, Millimet and Rangaprasad (2007) find that Illinois schools only compete under periods of binding revenue 
constraint or 'tax caps' by evaluating constrained versus unconstrained counties. 
8 Anselin (1988) . 
9 See, e.g. Kelenkoski and Lacombe (2008)., who show that controlling for spatial correlation significantly' changes their 
results . 
lQ'Inputs' include teacher salary, the student-teacher ratio, total per-student expenditure, per-student capital expenditure, 
and school size. 
4 3 Data and Methodology 
a union's comparison list increases teacher salaries by about eighty four to ninety one cents - a larger effect 
than in Greenbaum's earlier study of the same state - while Millimet and Rangaprasad define 'neighbors' as 
districts in the same county and find spillovers in salary of about fifty six cents to a dollar per neighboring 
dollar. Winters (2010) applies a general spatial model (SAC) to a national sample of public schools and finds 
spillover effects on the order of sixty four cents per neighboring dollar of teacher salary using a distance-based 
weighting scheme. 
Nonetheless, there is appreciable need for further research. My work most closely follows from Millimet 
and Rangaprasad (2007), who perform the most careful estimation and instrumentation out of any study 
examining multiple inputs. They assert that strategic competition between sChool districts only occurs 
during periods of revenue constraint caused by tax caps; Ohio's 'property tax reduction factor' thus makes 
it a strong case for such conipetition. However, they restrict the effects of strategic competition to districts 
within the same county. This imposes a somewhat arbitrary structure on the·data, sharply delineating the 
bounds of an educational market where reality may well be more complex. Their failure to provide robustness 
testing for the structure of the spatial weights matrix is not unusual in spatial econometric research, but it 
nonetheless introduces the possibility that their results are idiosy~cratic to their particular choice of spatial 
weights. 11 
This paper contributes to the existing body of literature by providing the first treatment of spatial 
dependence in school outputs (Le. test scores) where competition is treated as endogenous. It also joins the 
small number of state-level studies employing spatial panel data, allowing for more accurate estimates in the 
presence of unobservable, time- or district-invariant heterogeneity. In addition, J.employ careful robustness 
testing for the form of the weighting matrix and Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation of the spatially lagged 
dependent variable (transforming the Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model into a reduced-form Spatial Lag 
of X (SLX) model) to provide greater confidence that the results are real. 12 
3 Data and Methodology 
Following'the existing literature and the brief theory outlined in the introduction, I assume that my 
dependent variables are correlated across space after controlling for other determiriants. 13 After verifying 
this assumption with statistical tests, I turn to regression analysis to determine whether the relationship 
is causal - that is, whether there are spillovers between neighboring school districts in teacher salaries and 
student achievement. The structural model estimated in this paper can thus be represented by aSpatial 
Autoregressive (SAR) model: 
(1) Yit = C+ pWYit + XitfJ + Cit 
where C is the constant term, and W is a nt x nt weights matrix that specifies the structure of the spatial 
correlation for the dependent variable. Because the spatial weights are assumed invariant across years, W is 
a concatenation of t identical n x n matrices along its diagonal; observations in each year interact with one 
another, but observations in different years are given relative weights of zero. Because W is an nt x nt matrix 
and Yis a nt x 1 vector, WY is a nt x 1 vector and WYit is a scalar representing a spatially-weighted sum of 
11 See Pliimper and Neumayer (2010) for a look at problems relating to misspecification of the weighting matrices. 
12 See Gibbons and Overman (2010) fora very good overview of endogeneity and identification issues in spatial econometric 
research: . 
13 I test for this formally with robust LM tests derived by Elhorst (2009). I find very strong evidence of spatial autocorrelation 
in both dependent variab.Ies. 
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neighboring Y values to district i in year t. The coefficient p measures the extent of spatial autocorrelation 
in the dependent variable, and c is ' a mean zero error term that is independent and identically .distributed 
across observations. 
Because of the presence of Y on the right-hand side of the SAR model, attempts at direct estimatIon 
suffer from obvious end6geneity problems. 14 To overcome these problems, I instrument for Y by estimating 
a Spatial (lag of) X (SLX) reduced-form of (1): 
(2) lit = C + W Zit'Y + X it f3 + cit 
Where'Y is a vector of coefficients, Z is a nt x k matrix of exogenous instruments and WZ'Y is used to 
instrument for pWY. In addition to increasing the strength (>f the argument for a causal effect from pWY, 
Instrumental Variables estimation is consistent in the presence of spatially-correlated error terms. 15 
I conduct several diagnostic tests for the validity of the IV estimates. First, I report the Kleibergen.:Paap 
(2006) rk LM statistic, an underidentification test for the relevance of the mstruments . . Second, I report 
the Kleibergen-Paap (2006)rk Wald Fstatistic for the strength of the instruments, using theeonventional 
rule-of-thumb value of 10. Finally, I report Hansen's J statistic, an overidentification test forthe validity of 
the instruments. 
I produce the spatial weights matrix as follows: each element 'Wij of W is the inverse of the distance 
between the centers of school districts i and j, with a 50-mile cutoff so that districts further than 50 miles 
from district i are given zero weight. The matrix is then normalized so tp.at its rows sum to one in order 
to act as a .set of weights and let any multiplicative effect emerge in p. Diagonal elements are set equal to 
zero so that no district is its oVm neighbor. Thus, each element of the vector WY is a distance-weighted 
average of Y across all other districts~thin .50 miles. The theoretical justification for the choice of inverse 
distance weights is the assumption that parents find it less costly to observe, move to or ' send their children 
to nearby dlstrictsthan those that are'far. The justification for the 50 mile radius is 'that school districts 
on one side of a large metropolitan area should still consider as neighbors school districts on the other side; 
when parents domove long distances within a metropolitan area, they are likely to move from suburbs into 
other suburbs rather than into the nearer city center. While I believe these are defensible assumptions, I 
provide robustness testing for the structure of the spatial weights matrix in Section 5. 
I estimate two empirical models in this paper, each a problem unto itself. The first seeks to uncover 
spillovers in, teacher salaries. Because the data does not include a measure of average teaCher . salary, I 
define it as a district's total expenditures on teacher salaries divided by the number of full-time equivalent 
(FTE) teachers. The explanatory variables fall into two categories: labor demand factors and labor supply 
factors. Among the factors influencing school districts' demand for labor are district size 16 (measured 
here by the number of schools in a district, the total enrollment, and the total number of teachers), the 
county unenwloyment rate,17 and the value of the property tax base. 18 Among the factors influencing labor 
supply are II.1ostly compensating differentials - Martin (forthcoming) suggests that teachers require higher 
salaries to teach students from disadvantaged backgrounds, so I control for the share of minority students 
and the share of low-income students as measured by eligibility for free and reduced-price lunch. Because 
Vedder and Hall (2000) report that teachers prefer a low student-teacher ratio, I include the student-teacher 
14 Again, see Gibbons and Overman (2010) for a full discussion, 
15 Kelejian and Prucha (1998) 
Ie Walden and Newmark (1995) 
17 Taylor (forthcoming) . 
18 e.g. Lentz (1998) . and Winters (2009) 
6 3 Data and Methodology 
ratio. Because teachers are also likely to require compensating differentials for most any type· of work 
above basic, elementary-level classroom teaching, I also include the proportion of secondary teachers, 19 
the proportions of kindergarten and prekindergarten teachers, the proportion of ungraded teachers, the 
proportion of students in individualizecl education programs (IEP) , and the proportion of students who 
are 'limited English proficientjEnglish language learners'(LEP JELL). Ohio is somewhat unique in allowing 
school districts to collect residence-based income taxes in addition to property taxes; I thus include a dummy 
variable for whether a district uses an income tax to control for any systematic differences that may cause 
or arise from the adoption of such a tax. Unfortunately, the data lacks measlires of union activity. Because 
teacher unions exert significant upward pressure on teacher wages,20 I expect to find bias in explanatory 
variables correlated with union activity. However, because changes in the union status of Ohio school districts 
are particularly rare, I expect a good deal of the effects of unionization to be absorbed by school district 
fixed effects. 
The second model tests for spilloveteffects in achievement test scores, examining proficiency rates on 
the five sections of the 10th-grade Ohio Gra<iuation Test (OGT). Explanatory variables related to this 
educational output largely involve uncontrollable student inputs and controllable institutional inputs. On 
the institutional side, there is 'some evidence21 that school districts benefit from increasing returns to scale 
in education production - so I include the number of schools in a district as well as the total enrollment. 
It is also pertinent to consider average teacher salary as a proxy for teacher qUality.22 Although there is 
fIlixed empirical evidence on the. effectiveness of a small student-teacher ratio in increasing test scores 23 
there is enough popular disCussion of this question that it is worth allowing for a possible effect. On the 
student side, students' race and socio-economic"status - the latter whiCh I proxy for here by median income 
and free lU:nch status - have been shown to influence test scores. 24 In addition, it is likely that students' 
ability to learn in a traditional, English-speaking classroom will influence test scores, .so it is reasonable 
to control for the proportion of students in ~P's and students who are LEP JELL. Following some more 
recent work demonstratirig :that female students perform better on average than males,25 I control for the 
proportion of female students. Some plausibly relevant variables are omitted from the study for lack of data. 
It might be important to know, for example, the experience and education of teachers and administrators. 
Fortunately, there is some debate as to whether these variables are actually significant in predicting student 
achievement. 26 
I employ different techniques to control for the non-stationarity of each time series. Much of the variation 
. . 
in teacher salaries appears t.o stem Krom random fluctuation - while teachers rarely experience nominal pay 
cuts, real wages can fall from year to year if nominal wages remain fixed or increase slowly. Therefore, it 
is appropriate to use fixed effects to account for the time-invariant difrerencesbetween districts as well as 
any year-to-year differences that may arise from changes in education finance at the state level. On the 
other hand, the state proficiency tests arefrequ~ntlyrewritten in such a fashion that yearly fixed effects are 
insufficient to explain some of the jumps in student performance. Because these changes are likely to capture 
more of the state's attitude .towards testing than any school district's quality, I use a first differences model 
for test scores. This allows me to attempt to tease out a measure of quality by examining which districts 
19 Walden and Sogutlu (2001) . 
20 See, e.g~ Hoxby (1996) 
21 e.g. Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2004), Bradley and Taylor (1998) 
22 Figlio (1997) 
23 See Hanushek (2003) for a discussion of the effectiveness of many educational inputs. 
24 See Geller et al. (2006) 
25 Such as U.S. Department of Education (2004) 
26 See, e.g. Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) 
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performed better or worse relative to the overall change in 'performance' when the Ohio Department of 
Education changes the tests. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics and Data. Sources 
Variable Mean Std. Dey Min Max Source 
Left-Hand Side 
% Proficient on Ohio Gradllation Test - Average 89.50% 7.22% 44.68% 100% ODE 
% Proficient on OGT - Reading 94.28% 5.32% 59.20% 100% ODE 
% ~roficient on OGT - Writing 93.61% 6.28% 49.10% 100% ODE 
% Proficient on OGT - Mathematics 86.07% 8.73% 12.00% 100% ODE 
% Proficient on OGT - Science 85.12% 10.63% 25.80% 100% ODE 
% Proficient on OGT - Social Studies 88.40% 8.86% 36.00% 100% ODE 
Average Teacher Salary $44,677 $6,426 $16,800 $76,099 CCD 
Right-Hand Side 
Number of Schools 6.05 9.44 1 153 CCD 
Total Enrollment 2,941 4,892 22 76,559 CCD 
FTE Teachers 182:7 338.2 18 6670.7 CCD 
Median Income $28,032 $6,362 $15,775 $65,666 ODE 
Students per Teacher 16.86 2.11 3.67 26.44 CCD 
Teachers per Student 0.061 0.008 0.043 0.270 CCD 
Average Property Value per Teacher $1,688;105 $808,250 $294,660 $8,667,604 ODT 
County Unemployment Rate 5.46% 1.34% 1.8% 14.4% BLS 
Proportion Prekindergarten Teachers 0.53% 0.95% 0% 14.08% CCD 
Proportion Kindergarten Teachers 4.25% 1.69% 0% 18.44% CCD 
Proportion Secondary Teachers 34.22% 8.19% 4.15% 95.59% CCD 
Proportion Ungraded Teachers 0.85% 2.48% 0% 67.01% CCD 
% Non-White 7.69% 14.85% 0% 100% CCD 
% Asian and Pacific Islander 0.7&.% 1.27% 0% 14.87% CCD 
% Black 5.44% 13.96% 0% 99.91% CCD 
% Hispanic 1.41% 3.04% 0% 38.93% CCD 
% Female 47.75% 2.07% 14.62% 59% CCD 
% Limited English Proficient 0.44% 2.20% 0% 59.02% . CCD 
% Individualized Education Program 13% 3.34% 1.68% 29.56% CCD 
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch · 24.ui% 15.57% 0% 86.2% CCD 
Does the District Use an Income Tax? .2466 .4311 0 1 CCD 
Note: All monetary values in 1998 dollars . 
. I use the same exogenous instruments for both models. These are the percentage' of female students 
enrolled in a school district, the median income for a school district, and the unemployment rate for the 
county. The latter two are defensibly exogenous to average teacher salaries and test. scores because they 
are determined by broader economic forces; although higher student achievement has been linked by many 
researchers to better labor market outcomes, such effects are neither likely to be significant on the time scale 
of the sample nor be confined toa particular school district. They are defensibly relevant to average teacher 
salaries and test scores because they partially determine both the labor market conditions facing prospective 
teachers and the expected return to education for students. The percentage of female students is defensibly 
exogenous to average teacher salaries and test scores because the proportion of female students enrolled in a 
particular school in a given year is essentially random; though the influence of all-female or all-male private 
schools may be of concern, it is unlikely to be large enough to offset the number of families ·with children in 
4 Empirical Findings 
public schools. The percentage of female students is defensibly relevant to both· instruments because female 
students are easier to teach and because they perform better than male students on standardized tests. 
Following Kelejianand Prucha (1998), I instrument for WY with the first and second-order spatial lags of 
these three variables. 
The data ~ which describe the population of Ohio public school districts - are drawn from four sources. 
The first is the U.S. Department of Education Common Core of Data (CCD), which is a~ailable from the 
National Center for Education Statistics. The CCD provides annual data for all Local Education Agencies in 
the United States, including traditional local school districts as well as regional education services agencies 
and public charter school agencies. In particular, the CCD provides some important data on stud€nts 
and staffing - including enrollment by gender, ethnicity, and proxies for socioeconomic status as well as . . 
staff breakdowns by occupation .- and richly-detailed breakdowns of annual revenue and exIJenditures. The 
second data source is the Ohio Department of Education (ODE)'s interactive Local Report Card, which 
provides district-level, annual data on such diverse measures as median incomes, proficiency . test scores, 
on-time graduation rates and disciplinary illcidents. The third is t~e Ohio Department of Taxation (ODT)'s 
Tax Data Series, which provides annual school district level data·on property values, taxes levied and tax 
rates. The fourth source of datais the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which provides county-level data 
on u~employment .rates and the Midwest Consumer Price Index I use to control for inflation. 
I restrict the sample along two lines. First, I remove the two school districts that came into existence 
during the sample period of ·1998-2007. Second, I remove five other districts - the four Lake Erie island 
schools and the College Corner school district (which is jointly administered by the Indiana Department 
of Education) ~. for missing data, enrollments of zero, and similar irregularities. After paring away these 
districts, I am left with a balanced panel of 607 school districts across 10 years, for a total of 6070 observations. 
I provide summary statistics in Table 1. 
4 Empirical Findings 
The main results for teacher salaries and test scores, respectively, are presented in Tables 2 and 3. I first 
note · that each. specification fares extremely well in terms of the identification tests; the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistics provide evidence that the instruments are relevant and : strong, while the Hansen J. test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity at any reasonable significance level. 
I turn my attention first to teacher salaries. Because the dependent variable is presented in logged form, 
the coefficients on the logged independent variables can be · interpreted as elasticities. For example, the 
estimated marginal effect of a 1% increase in the number of schools in a district is a 0.028% increase in 
average teacher salaries in that district. · For the independent variables that are proportions or percentages, 
the coefficients report the effect of an increase of 100 percentage points (from 0 to 1). Therefore, a one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in a district . is expected to decrease average teacher 
salaries by 0.448%. 
The results tend to agree with expectations and with previo~s studies, but there are a few notable 
differences. Firstly, there is a strong relationship between student enrollment, teacher employment and 
teacher salaries. These coefficients should be interpreted with a degree of caution; it is unlikely that enrolling 
one percent more students increases teacher salaries by 0.4%, or that employing one percent more teachers 
decreases teacher salaries by 0.5%, ·but rather that these variables tend to increase or decrease together 
to smaller net effect. I also find that teachers who teach minority students are paid less, not more. This 
relationship is likely non-linear and likely due to the extremely skewed distribution of minority students in 
Table 2: Strategic interaction over average teacher salaries 
W*Ln(Average Teacher Salaries) 
Ln(Number of Schools) 
tn(Total Enrollment) 
Ln(Full Time Equivalent Teachers) 
% Non-White 
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch 
% Individualized Education Program 
% Limited English Proficient 
Ln (Students per Te.acher) 
Proportion Prekindergarten Teachers 
Proportion Kindergarten Teachers 
Proportion Secondary Teachers 
Proportion Ungraded Teachers 
Ln(Median Income) 
County Unemployment Rate 
Ln(Average Property Value per Teacher) 
School District Income Tax Dummy 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (underidentification test) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak identification test) 



































[p = 0.000] 
28.30 
[p = 0.812] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the average salary for all teachers in a school district. 
Estimation is by GMM. The instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first- and 
second-order spatial lags of the county unemployment rate, the natural log of the school district's median income, 
and the percentage of female students in the district. Additional controls include school district and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbi.trary heteroskedasticity. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1 % 
Ohio; when the dependent variable is taken as a level instead of a log, the coefficient changes sign. However, 
there is some reason to be more confident in the insignificance of free lunch status in determining teaCher 
salary. Because Southeast Ohio is both the poorest area in the state and the area with the fewest minority 
students - and because .Ohio's rural areas in general have fewer minority students and lower incomes than the 
9 
10 
Table 3: Strategic interaction over state st andardized test scores 
W*Standardized Test Scores 
Ln(Nu~ber of Schools) 
Ln(Total Enrollment) 
Ln(Average Teacher Salary) 
Ln(Median Income) 
Ln(Teachers per Student) 
% Asian and Pacific Islander 
% Black 
% Hispanic 
% Individualized Education Program 
% Limited English Proficient 
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch 
% Female 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (underidentification test) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (weak identification test) 



























[p = D.OOOJ 
39.94 
[p"; 0.733J 
4 Empirical Find ings 
Notes: The dependent variable is the one-year (Le. first) difference of the average percentage of students scoring 
'proficient' or higher across all five' sections of the Ohio Graduation Test (Reading, Writing, Mathematics, Science, 
Social Studies). Estimation is via GMM,and all independent variables are also first differences. The .instrument set 
for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first differences of the first- and second-order spatial lags of 
the county unemployment rate, the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of female 
students in the district. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
* Significant at 10.%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
suburbs ~ Ohio is a good case for examining poverty independent of race. It may be that teachers truly do 
not require compensating differentials to teach poor students, but that previous studies conflate the effects 
of student race and poverty. Finally, I find no impact on teacher salaries from the use of a school district 
income tax. These taxes are sometimes financially motivated but sometimes politically motivated (because 
they are less regressive than property taxes), and may not be a good overall indicator. or determinant of a 
district's revenue. 
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable bears a little more interpretation. Though it also 
represents an elasticity - and an elasticity very close to one - the variable itself is a distance-weighted sum 
of the logged average teacher salaries in all school districts within a 50 mile radius. Therefore, a 1% increase 
in teacher salaries in all other school districts within .'?O miles would be expected to increase teacher salaries 
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by 0.985% in the district in question. An increase of more than 1% in districts that are near and less than 
1% in districts that are far will also be expected to increase teacher salaries in the district of interest by 
about 0.985%. However, we should expect a 1% increase in the average teacher salary in a single particular 
district to raise teacher salaries in nearby districts by some fraction of 0.985%, because school districts under 
this weighting scheme have many neighbors. Therefore, we should only expect to see large changes in salary 
when many school districts are affected by exogenous shocks to the labor market. 
Next, I turn to the evidence from proficiency tests. Note that 4ere the dependent variable is presented 
in level form; therefore, the interpretations of the estimated coefficients should be as percentage points and 
not percentages. For example, a 1% annual increase in the median income in a district might be expected to 
increase the proportion of students earning' 'proficient' or higher on the Ohio Graduation Test by just one 
thousandth of a percentage point· over the previous year (although of course the effect is not significant). 
The interpretation for an independent variable in level form is as' above - its coefficient represents the effect 
of an increase from 0% to 100%. Therefore, an increase of one percentage point in the proportion of black 
students is expected to result in a decrease in the proportion of students earning 'proficient' or higher on the 
OGT by 0.2 percentage points versus the previous year. 
Overall, I find that little besides the strategic effect is significant; it is likely that the levels of the 
independent variables matter more for overall student achievement than the year-to-year differences matter 
foryear~to-year changes in achievement. The caveat for interpreting the spatial autoregressive term is the 
same: . though a school district is expected to increase its scores by around 1.058 percentage points for each 
one percentage point increase in the test scores . of all neighbOIjng districts, the spillover from anyone school 
. district to its neighbors will be smaller. The overall implications of an estimate of 1.058 are that school 
districts will respond in small ways to changes in each neighboring district so that they maintain parity with 
their neighbors overall- or, at least, that they do not fall further behind. 
Although these results are strong and the tests confirm the validity ofthe instruments, some concern may 
linger about the directionality of these simultaneously-determined inputs and outputs. Therefore I turn to 
the lagged specific~tions in Table 4. The lagged models allow me to establish a clearer direction of causation 
- because a district's behavior this year cannot change what its neighbors did last year- and to establish 
some sort of 'window' v.rithinwhich strategic competition occurs. 
Table 4; Strategic interaction across time . 
.Dependent Variable Ln (Average Teacher Salary) Average OGT Performance 
Time Lag (Years) 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
W'Dependent Variable 0.985'" 1.309" 0.790" 0.373 ·0.267 1.086'" 1.184'" 1.337'" 1.052'" -0.648 
(0.202) (0.335) (0.375) (0.268) (0.395) (0.159) (0.201) (0.237) (0.281) (0.~S8) 
Number of Observations 6070 5463 4856 4249 3642 6070 5463 4856 4249 3642 
Underidentification Test [0.000] [0.0001 [O.OOO} [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [O.OOO} [0.000] 
Weak Identification Test 28.30 11.60 13.23 41.90 '25.33 58.03 42.71 33 .03 26.28 26.67 
Overidentification Test [0.812] [0.4291 [0.0191 [0.000] [O.OOO} [0,633] [0.011] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Note: Estimation is via GMM. The instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent va.riable comprises. the first- and second-order spatial lags of the 
county unemploymen~ rate, the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of 'female students in the distrkt. Additi'onal controls 
include school district and year fixed effects. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, with p-values in brackets. Standard errors in parentheses rue 
robust to arbitrary hE;teroskedasticity. 
* SigniScant ~t 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
The results are striking; in both models, the point estimates for the one year lag on strategic competition 
are greater than their contemporaneous counterparts (although neither.is significantly different from one). 
The point estimates for the elasticity of strategic competition range between 0.79 and 1.337, and appear to 
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follow an inverted 'U' shape. This evidence weakly suggests that districts may be better able to respond to 
neighbors' behavior as they have observed it in the past than what they expect it to be in the present. Iri 
both cases, . lags are not significant beyond three years, suggesting that districts respond more immediately. 
However, these results come with two important caveats. First, I use a fixed effects model instead of a first 
differences model for the standardized test scores. While I am unsure that fixed effects can appropriately 
model the frequent changes to the Ohio Graduation Test,usingfirst differences makes it impossible to 
gain any meaningful infomllition from .a lagged regression. 27 Second, the regression diagnostics raise some 
concern about the validity of the results; specifically, most of the lagged results reject the null hypothesis 
of instrument validity in the Hansen J test. In addition, the J statistic grows with the time lag. I selected 
the instrumental variables - the unemployment rate, median income, and percentage of female students -
for their plausible, intuitiveexogeneity. There is no similarly intuitive reaSon to stIspect reverse causation 
between teacher salaries today and; for instance, the unemployment rate two years ago. Regardless, the 
lagged results should be viewed with some amount of caution for these two reasons. 
5 . Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is important (though often neglected) for spatial econometrics, because the structure 
of the spatial weights is decided arbitrarily by the researcher and not estimated from the data. It is the~efore 
possible to obtain results that are idiosyncratic to a particular choice of weights matrix and that disappear 
when alternative weights are used. To attempt to banish such concerns, I estimate the full, contemporaneous-
time model using a variety of spatial weights matrices. Although I tested agreat many different specifications, 
I present a representative few in Table 5. 
Table 5: · Robustness of spatial weights . matrix 
Dependent Variable Ln(Average Teacher Salary) Average OGT Performance 
Weights Type Binary Inverse Inverse 4 Nearest Binary . . Inverse Inverse 4 Nearest 
Distance Distance Squared Neigh- D.istance Distance Squared Neigh-
Distance . ·bors Distance bors 
Cutoff Distance 50 nU. 25 nU. 75 mi. N/A 50 mi. 25 nU. 75 nU. N/A 
W*Dependent Variable 1.145*** 1.396 0.748* 1.386** 1.049**- 1.047*** 1.052*** ·1.059*** 
(0.134) (0.850) (0.442) (0.651) (0.092) (0.108) (0.100) (0.132) 
Underidentification Test [0.000] [0.235] [0.008] [0.302] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Weak Identification Test 169.36 1.35 3.05 1.19 64.55 23.28 29.44 12~76 
Overidentification Test [0.278] [0.193] [0.054] [0.968] (0.211] [0.986] [0.642] [0.859] 
Note: Estimation is via GMM. The instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first- and second-order 
spatial lags of the county unemployment rate, the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of female 
students in the district . . For the test. score results, these instruments (like the dependent variable) are first differences. Percentage 
female instruments were dropped fot the binary distance regressions, as the full instrument set was overidentified. Additional 
controls are as in Tables 2 and 3. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, with p-values in brackets. Standard errors in 
parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
The first robustness test involves changing the weighting scheme - though I maintain the cutoff at fifty 
miles, I change the distance weighting to a 'binary' scheme to that all districts within fifty miles receive equal 
weight. The second alternative specification weights by inverse distance like the primary models, but uses 
a twenty-five mile cutoff to reduce the distance at which districts call be considered neighbors at all. The 
27 The difference between test scores last year and two years ago should be independent of the difference between this year 
and last year. Indeed, lagged difference regressions were all insignificant. 
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third weights structure changes both the weights and the cutoff distance, allowing districts to be considered 
neighbors out to a radius of severity-five miles but weighting them by the square of the inverse distance 
to increase the relative weight given to nearby districts. The final weights matrix does something entirely 
different, choosing the four nearest districts and giving them each a weight of one quarter. 
The results support the validity of the primary regressions,. though the evidence is a great deal more 
robust for test scores than . for teacher salaries. While the diagnostics generally support the exogeneity 
of the instruments, the teacher salary regressions suffer from weak instrument and/or instrument relevance 
problems for three of the four matrices. This is likely a function of the data available, rather than the validity 
of the theory; the most significant instrumental variableaffecting teacher salaries is the unemployment rate, 
where data is only available at the county level. Because the twenty five mile cutoff, the squared inverse 
distance weights, and the four nearest neighbors weights all place great weight on observations which are 
likely to be in the same county; they suffer from a lack of variation in the values of that exogenous instrument. 
In particular, the fifty mile binary wei~;ht ~atrix - which puts greater relative weight on distant districts 
than the inverse distance matrix -benefits from more variation in the unemployment rate llJld thus appears 
to identify the strategic effect more .strongly than the primary specification. 
In addition to the sensitivity analysis for the weights structure, I perform one final set of regressions -
comparing the primary results to those obtained from non-spatial Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); from Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML), and from a poorly-instrumented GMM that uses all of W X and W 2 X as instruments. 
As mentioned in Section I, the presence of spatial dependence can cause non-spatial estimates to be biased 
and inconsistent. Though ML estimation is often used in the spatial econometrics literature, the endogeneity 
of WY creates a far larger problem .for the estimates than the "spurious precision" (Gibbons and Overman 
2010) ofML is worth. And thoughKelejian and Prucha (1998) have co~firmed that {X, WX, W 2X, ... } 
are valid instruments for estimating spatial autoregressive models by Two Stage Least Squares or GMM, 
a number of applied researchers performing spatial econometrics simply include all of the.se ~instruments' 
without considering that several variables in X are likely to be endogenous. Therefore it is worthwhile to 
examine the possible biases caused by these errors in estimation. These results are presented · in Tables 6 
and 7. 
The non-spatial estimates in Table 6 appear to suffer from some slight biases and errors; the we11-
instrumented regression finds stronger evidence than the others that teachers who teach minority students 
are paid less, and weaker evidence that teachers who teach IEP students are paid more. Overall, the problems 
that incorrectly estimating the spatial autoregressive term inflicts on the non-spatial estim<.ttes are minor -
even for the OLS regression that simply ignores spatial dependence. On the other hand, the estimates for 
the spatial autocorrelation coefficient p suffer from severe biases when improperly estimated: Not only do 
ML eStimation and poor GMM instrumentation significantly underestimate the effects of strategic competi-
tion, they also provide the aforementioned "spurious precisi~n"; the standard errors for poorly-instrumented 
GMM and ML are roughly one-quarter and one-tenth the size ofthose for the properly instrumented regreS"' 
sian. Rather than providing roughly correct coefficient estimates, these methods produce estimates that are 
precisely wrong. 
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Table 6: Strategic interaction over average teacher salaries - model comparison 
Model Nonspatial Maximum GMM- 'Bad' GMM - 'Good' 
OLS Likelihood Instrument Set Instrument Set 
W*Ln(Average Teacher Salaries) 0.314*** 0.433*** 0.985*** 
(0.017) (0.053) (0.202) 
Ln(Number of Schools) 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.607) (0.007) 
Ln(Total Enrollment) 0.425*** 0.417*** 0.392*** 0.399*** 
(0.013) (0.013) . (0 .020) (0.022) 
Ln(FUlI Time Equivalent Teachers) -0.502*** -0.501 *** -0.479*** -0.499*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0 .024) (0.027) 
% Non-White -0.062* -0.080** -0.055 -0.118*** 
(0.035) (0.033) (0.038) (0.042) 
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch 0.012 0.015 -0.010 0.021 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
%Individualized Education PrOgram 0.107** 0.098** 0.126*** 0.080* 
(0.043) (0.040) (0 .046) (0.048) 
% Limited English Proficient o.lig*** .0.115*** 0.105*** 0.109*** 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.031). (0.031) 
Ln(Sfudents per Teacher) 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.175*** 0.177*** 
(0.014) .(0.013) (0 .015) (0.015) 
Proportion Prekindergarten Teachers. -0.307*** -0.315*** -0.340*** -0.324*** 
(0.101) (0.095) (0·. 102) (Oj05) 
Proportion Kindergarten Teachers 0.103** 0.122** 0.108* 0.158*** 
(0.052) (0.049) (0 .057) (0.05~) 
Proportion Secondary Teachers 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.037** 0.040*** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0015) (0.015) 
P~oportion Ungraded Teachers 0.Ql6 0.022 0.Oi2 ·0.031 
(0 .031) (0.030) (0 ,037) . (0 .040) 
Ln(Median Income) 0;040 0.047 0.010 : 0.046 
(0.193) (0.182) (0.209) · (0.221) 
County Unemployment ·Rate -0.510*** ~0.489*** -0.464**~ -0.448*** 
(O ~ l11) (0 .105) (0.105) (0.109) 
Ln(Average Property Value per Teacher) 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0 .009) (0.009) 
School District Incom~ Tax Dummy -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Robust to Arbitrary Heteroskedasticity NO NO YES YES 
Underidentification Test [p= O.OOQ] [p = 0.000] 
Weak Identification Test 485.02 28.30 
Overidentification Test [p = 6,000] [p = 0.812] 
Notes: ·The dependent va.riable is ·the natural log of-the average salary for all teachers in a school district. The 'good' instrument 
set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises the first- and second-order spatial lags of the county unemployment 
rate, the natural log of the schooldistrict 's median income, and the percentage of female students in the district. The 'bad' 
instrument set for the .spatially lagged dependeJ).t variable comprises the first- and second-order spatial lags· of all right hand side 
variables in the model. Additional controls are school district and year fixed effects. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2 
and 3, with p-values in brackets. . 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
Table 7: Strategic interaction over state standardized test scores - model comparison 
Model Nonspatial Maximum GMM- 'Bad' GMM - 'Good' 
OLS Likelihood InstrUIpent Set Instrument Set 
W*Standardized Test Scores 0.920*** 1.014*** 1.059*** 
(0.017) (0.031) (0.093) 
Ln(Number of Schools) 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 
(0.008) (0.006) (0 .008) (0.007) 
Ln(Totai Enrollment) 0.083*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.015 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) 
Ln(Average Teacher Salary) 0.107*** 0.006 0.0003 -0.004 
(0.018) (0 .013) (0.015) (0.017) 
Ln(Median Income) -1.413*** 0.0004 0.047 0.099 
(0.117) (0.025) (0.090) (0.155) 
Ln(Teachers per Student) 0.122*** 0.013 0.006 -O~OOl 
(0-018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) 
% Asian and Pacific Islander -0.441 -0.010 0.046 0.066 
(0.404) (0.302) (0.266) (0.270) 
% Black -0.180 -0.210** -0.220** -0.207** 
(0.U8) (0 .089) (0.105) (0.104) 
% Hispanic -0.217- -0.145 -0.072 -0.125 
(0.201) '(0.151) (0.185) (0.185) 
% Individualized Education Program 0.066 -0.020 -0.008 -0.017 
(0.060) (0.044) (0.049) (0.050) 
% Limited English Proficient 0.005 -0.025 -0.018 -0.022 
(0.074) (0.055) (0.036) (0.031) 
% Free and Reduced-Price Lunch -0,048** -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.020) (0.015) (0 .018) (0.018) 
% Female -0.012" -0.021 -0.035 -0.025 
(0.044) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) 
Robust to Arbitrary Heteroskedasticity NO NO YES YES 
Underidentification Test " [p = O:ooOJ [p = o.oOOJ 
Weak Identification Test 159.92 39.94 
Overidentification Test [p = 0.581J [p = 0.733J 
Notes: The dependent variable is the one-year (i.e. first) difference of the average percentage of students scoring 'proficient' or 
higher aCross all five sections of the Ohio Graduation Test (Reading, Writing, Mathematics, Science, Social Studies). Estimation 
is via GMM, and all independent variables are also first differences. The 'good' instrument set for the spatially lagged 
dependent variable comprises the first differences of the first- and second-order spatial lags of the county unemployment rate, 
the natural log of the school district's median income, and the percentage of female students in the district. The 'bad' 
instrument set for the spatially lagged dependent variable comprises" the first- and second-order spatial lags of all right hand side 
variables in the model. Tests reported are the same as in Tables 2 and 3, with p-values in brackets. 
• Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
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The case for test scores is different: the biases in the spatial autocorrelation coefficient are relatively 
minor compared to those for teacher salaries. While the ML regression estimates the strategic effect to be 
significantly less than one - again, partially due to artificial precision in the standard errors - the poorly-
instrumented GMM finds :results that are not significantly different from those of the well-instrumented 
model and which still pass the statistical test for instrument validity.28 The most striking differences are 
now between the spatial and non-spatial models. The non-spatial OL8 model makes serious errors of both 
types - including the confusing conclusion that a 1 % increase in a school district's median income will 
28 The poorly-instrumented model is likely 'saved' here by the lack of information in the largely insignificant control variables 
that comprise its i.nstrument set. 
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decrease test scores by about 1.4 points. These results hig~light the importance of testing and controlling 
for spatial autocorrelation even in non-spatially minded work. 
6 Conclusion 
Invoking a broad theoretical and empirical foundation of strategic competition between local schools, 
I employ a spatial autoregressive model to examine the extent of such competition between public school 
districts in Ohio. Building upon previous results which provide evidence that school districts behave strategi-
cally when setting input levels, I extend the field of competition to outputs and find a significant competitive 
effect whose magnitude suggests schools act to maintain parity with their neighbors. I show that the sig-
nificance and magnitude of this competitive effect is robust to various definitions of 'Iieighbor', and provid~ 
evidence that these strategic effects persist within a two to th:r:ee year window. I further provide suggestive 
evidence that the'true magnitude of competition may be larger than found iIi some previous studies due to 
the biases induced by treating such competition as exogenous. 
The policy implications of these findings are reassuring; a defensibly causal. estimate of parity for the 
spatial autocorrelation parameter suggests that school districts actively 'keep up' 'with their neighbors. 
Therefore, fruitful innovations undertaken at just a few schools may spread to others' over time. This provides 
some support for the ',bottom-up', experimental paradigm of school reform; it suggests that uniform standards 
, , 
may not be necessary for uniform improvement. However, because the spatial autocorrelation parameter is 
not significantly greater than one, the results suggest that schools will make no such improvements without 
some form of impetus. 
The results presented in this paper open up several avenues for further research. Empirical analysis 
to confirm the robustness of the relationship - particularly in other states - is necessary. Because'charter 
schools are often regarded as the champions of the experimental paradigm of school reform, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate whether traditional public schools also respond to the decisions of nontraditional 
pubIlc or private schools. This study also presents a 'black box' view of competition in educational outputs: 
Are spillovers in test scores merely a function of spillovers in inputs such as teacher salaries and capital 
expenditures? Of is there a Significant unobservable component, perhaps the adoption of successful curricula 
or teaching metho.ds? A multidimensional model allowing for cross-policy effects like ,that used by Millimet 
and Rangaprasad (2007) may be able to answer this question,· but it is beyond the scope of this pap'er. 
That said, my ,findings contribute to the growing pool of evide~c~ suggesting that competition can alter 
the behavior of public schools, and also provide reassurance that spillovers in school inputs found in previous 
studies carry over to the case of outputs - that competition among public schools provides real benefits to 
students. 
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